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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-REVISING THE
APPLICATION OF TINKER AND FRASER IN THE
AGE OF THE INTERNET-J.S. EXREL. SNYDER V
BLUE MOUNTAIN SCHOOL DISTRICT, 650 F.3D 915
(3D CIR. 2011)
Since the Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District' decision, the Internet has significantly impacted the ways that
schools and students exchange information.2 School and home have long
been considered separate entities, whereby students enjoy an extended veil
of physical privacy shielding them once they leave school grounds.3 With
the continual development of communication technology, especially social
media, such a veil no longer shrouds students in an all-protective manner.4

1 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
2

See id.at 504 (discussing facts as occurring in December 1965); Wisniewski v. Bd. of

Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 39-40 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting it is reasonably
foreseeable that online speech distributed to fifteen students would reach school); see also Martha
McCarthy, Cyberspeech Controversies in the Third Circuit, 258 EDUC. LAW REP. 1, 8 (2010)
(discussing potential for rapid dissemination of evidence via the Internet).
3 See Aaron Marcus, Note, Beyond the Classroom: A Reality Based Approach to Student
Drug Testing, 3 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 365, 388 (2004) ("Although students do not
have a full expectation of privacy in school, when outside school, society recognizes the rights of
all people, old and young, to be free from the watchful eye of the state."). The author continues
by quoting a decision from the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Id. That
court stated, "[O]ur willingness to defer to the schoolmaster's expertise in administering school
discipline rests, in large measure, upon the supposition that the arm of authority does not reach
beyond the schoolhouse gate." Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d
1043, 1044-45 (2d Cir. 1979); see also Interview with Hon. Thomas I. Vanaskie, Judge, Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in Scranton, Pa. (Dec. 19, 2011) (audio on file with
author) ("This inside-outside distinction [regarding the location of where the student speech
occurs] is illusory.").
4 See McCarthy, rictrictrictsupranote 2, at 13 ("Electronic communication definitely is the
preferred mode for students to express their views currently, and it has the potential to reach a far
larger audience ....
");see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § 370 (2010) (defining and
prohibiting cyber-bullying). The Massachusetts Legislature made it illegal for students to use
Internet or electronic methods of bullying where it affects the victim's rights while at school, or
causes physical or emotional damage to the student, regardless of location. Id. But see Joseph A.
Tomain, Cyberspace isOutside the Schoolhouse Gate: Offensive, Online Student Speech Receives
First Amendment Protection, 59 DRAKE L. REv. 97, 122-28 (2010) (outlining difficulty courts
have had applying precedent to cyberspace). Just as schools have struggled to determine the
outer bounds of their authority, various courts have struggled in terms of coming up with
appropriate legal analogies to determine jurisdiction in the cyberspace context. Id. at 124. Two
distinct ways of thinking have developed in relation to this debate: exceptionalists and
unexceptionalisits. Id. at 123. Exceptionalists view cyberspace as inherently different from
physical space and requiring a completely new set of legal rules. Id. On the other hand,
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5
In J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District,
the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit confronted the issue of whether
speech, which occurred completely outside of the school, could be subject
to either the Tinker or Bethel School DistrictNo. 403 v. Fraser6 restrictions
on school speech.7 The court provided a thorough analysis, but failed to
differentiate between the continually-accessible nature of online speech as
opposed to standard forms of speech, such as the spoken word or physical
documents. 8 Given the challenges schools face in terms of regulating
student speech that has the capacity to reach into the classroom, courts need
to develop a more defined test than either Tinker or Frasercurrently offer. 9
The Snyder incident began on Sunday, March 18, 2007 when J.S.,
an eighth-grade student at the Blue Mountain Middle School, used her
home computer to create a fake MySpace profile for her school's principal,
James McGonigle, in retaliation for him disciplining J.S. for two recent
uniform violations. 10 The profile did not identify McGonigle by name, but
included his official photograph from the school website, his occupation,
and a reference to his wife's name, who works as a guidance counselor at
the same school." The structure of the profane-ridden profile suggested

unexceptionalists believe that proper analogies can be drawn between cyberspace and territorial
legal rules. Id.
' 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011) (enbanc), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012).
6 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
7 Snyder, 650 F.3d at 927-28 (discussing general rule laid out in Tinker and exception
detailed in Fraser). The majority ultimately held that the Tinker exception did not apply because
there was no reasonable fear of a substantial disruption, based on the "nonsensical" nature of the
MySpace profile. Id. at 929-30. A MySpace profile is a social networking website that can be
viewed by anyone who either types the proper Internet address or searches a term contained
within the profile. Id. at 920-21. J.S. made the profile "private" on Monday, March 19, 2007, the
day after she created it, after several students mentioned the profile to her in school. Id. The
majority also determined that the Fraser exception should not come into play because "Fraser
does not apply to off-campus speech." Id. at 932.

8 See Alison Virginia King, Note, Constitutionality of Cyberbullying Laws: Keeping the
Online Playground Safe for Both Teens and Free Speech, 63 VAND. L. REV. 845, 870 (2010)

("The Internet obscures the boundary between on-campus and off-campus speech, leaving
schools and courts to grapple with how to treat the 'grey area' created by the vast amount of
online speech created off-campus that is accessed on-campus and affects students at school."); see
also Interview with Hon. Thomas I. Vanaskie, supra note 3 (questioning whether where profile is
created is relevant factor to evaluate).
9 See Alexander G. Tuneski, Note, Online, Not on Grounds: Protecting Student Internet

Speech, 89 VA. L. REV. 139, 153 (noting various approaches courts have adopted in dealing with
internet-based speech). The three approaches all involve applying Tinker in different respects.
Id. The first approach applies Tinker's substantial disruption test only if the speech is viewed on

campus, while the second approach applies the test in all circumstances. Id. The third approach
treats all off-campus student speech as protected generally. Id.
10

Snyder, 650 F.3d at 920 (discussing factual background of case). The uniform violations

occurred in December 2006 and February 2007, a few months before J.S. created the profile. Id.
11 Id. at 920-21 (noting contents of MySpace page). Moreover, it identified McGonigle as a
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that McGonigle had sex in his office; that he was sexually attracted to
students and their parents; that he engaged in various types of sexual
activity, possibly even bestiality; and the profile ridiculed his son's
appearance. 12 The profile was initially fully accessible to anyone with the
Internet URL or who found it through a basic Internet search, but the page
was made "private" after several students approached J.S. at school on
Monday, March 19.13 Thereafter, twenty-two students from that school
district could view the full profile, but it could never be accessed from
school computers because there is no access to MySpace.' 4
On Tuesday, March 20, McGonigle became aware of the profile
when a student brought it to his attention; McGonigle asked the student to
find out who created the profile.' 5 That student later reported J.S. as the
creator, and on Wednesday, March 21, the student provided McGonigle

bisexual individual and called his wife the "FRAINTRAIN," in an apparent sexual reference. Id
McGonigle's wife, Debra Frain, is a guidance counselor at the school. Id. at 921.
12 Id. at 920-21.
In the "About me" section of the profile, J.S. included the following
paragraph:
HELLO CHILDREN[.]
yes.
it's your oh so wonderful, hairy,
expressionless, sex addict, fagass, put on this world with a small dick
PRINCIPAL[.] I have come to myspace so i can pervert the minds of other
principal's [sic] to be just like me. I know, I know, you're all thrilled[.]
Another reason I came to myspace is because-I am keeping an eye on you
students (who[m] I care for so much)[.] For those who want to be my
friend, and aren't in my school[,] I love children, sex (any kind), dogs, long
walks on the beach, tv, being a dick head, and last but not least my darling
wife who looks like a man (who satisfies my needs) MY FRAINTRAIN

Id. at 921 (alterations in original). The profile also included in its interest section: "detention,
being a tight ass, riding the fraintrain, spending time with my child (who looks like a gorilla),
baseball, my golden pen, fucking in my office, hitting on students and their parents." Id. at 920.
13 Snyder, 650 F.3d at 921 (outlining when profile was openly available and when it was
made "private"). When a MySpace page is made "private," it can only be viewed by those who
are given access by the profile's creator. Id.
Id. (noting "no Blue Mountain student was ever able to view the profile from school").
See generally Amanda Lenhart, Teens, Cell Phones and Texting, PEW RESEARCH CENTER
INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, available at http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1572/teens-cellphones-text-messages (last visited February 18, 2012) (discussing wide-ranging use of cell
phones among teens). According to recent research, twenty-seven percent of teenagers use their
"multi-purpose" mobile phones to access the internet. Id. Moreover, twenty-three percent access
social networking sites, such as MySpace, by using their cell phones and other mobile devices.
Id. Although the Snyder court stated that "no Blue Mountain student" accessed the profile from
school, the court did not discuss the use of mobile phones on campus and was only referring to
access via school-owned computers. 650 F.3d at 921.
15 Snyder, 650 F.3d at 921 (reviewing McGonigle's initial response to the profile).
McGonigle attempted to access the profile, but was unable to do so despite contacting MySpace
directly. Id.
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with a printout of the profile that subsequently McGonigle showed to
Superintendent Joyce Romberger, Director of Technology Susan
Schneider-Morgan, and guidance counselors Michelle Guers and Debra
Frain. 16 On Thursday, March 22, McGonigle and Guers jointly met with
J.S. to discuss the profile, which she initially denied creating, but later
admitted to her involvement. 17 The school suspended J.S. for ten days,
which included her being barred from all school dances, and McGonigle
also contacted MySpace to have the profile removed.' 8 J.S. appealed the

suspension to the superintendent, but the request was denied.19
As a result of the MySpace profile, the school district claimed that
there were several incidents of both in-class and out-of-class disruptions
that required corrective actions by teachers, and resulted in several
counselors modifying their normal schedules.20 J.S., through her parents,
filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania alleging violation of J.S.'s First
Amendment rights .2z At the close of discovery, both parties moved for
16

Id. (discussing who McGonigle consulted about profile). After meeting with these various

school administrators and counselors, McGonigle determined the profile was a "Level Four
Infraction under the Disciplinary Code of Blue Mountain Middle School" because it involved
false accusations about a staff member and also violated copyright laws by unlawfully using his
photograph from the school's website. Id.
17 Id. at 922 (noting parties involved in initial meeting with J.S.). Although a second student,
K.L., was also involved in making the profile and disciplined by the school, K.L. was not part of
the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action initiated by J.S. through her parents. Id. at 923.
1 Id. at 922.
19 Id. at 923.

20

Snyder, 650 F.3d at 922-23 (outlining profile's effect on school activities). As evidence of

the disruption, the school noted that two teachers approached McGonigle to discuss disruptions to
their class due to J.S.'s posting of the profile. Id. First, Randy Nunemacher, a math teacher,
stated that on one occasion he had to stop class for about five minutes when a group of roughly
six students were discussing the profile. Id. at 922. On another occasion, Nunemacher had to tell
two students to stop discussing the profile in class. Id. at 922-23. Although these disruptions
were caused by the profile, Nunemacher stated that they were not unusual based on the normal
interruptions that occur in his classes. Id. at 923. Angela Werner, another teacher, said she was
approached by a group of girls about the profile, but that it was during independent work time, so
the class was not disrupted. Id. Concerning the guidance counselors, Frain had to cancel several
appointments to supervise a testing period that was originally assigned to Guers. Id. The change
was necessary to facilitate the meeting between J.S., K.L., the parents, McGonigle, and Guers.
Id.

21 Id. at 920, 923 (delimitating outset of procedural history). See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(2006). The statute states in full:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
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summary judgment, and the court granted the motion in favor of the school
district, with the district court relying on Morse v. Frederick2 2 and Fraser,
while also acknowledging that Tinker is less applicable due to the out-ofschool nature of the speech. 23 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
heard the parents' appeal and affirmed the lower court decision, holding
that the Tinker substantial disruption test applied because McGonigle
reasonably forecasted a substantial disruption based solely on the contents
of the profile. 24 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
voted to rehear the 2case
en banc, thereby vacating previous Third Circuit
5
review and holding.
Starting with the 1943 seminal decision in West Virginia State
Board of Education v.Barnette,26 there have been a long series of cases
that have specifically dealt with the issue of a student's right to free
speech.27 While Barnette dealt exclusively with school compelling speech,

proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial
officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity,
injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated
or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any
Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be
considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
Id. The original claim included McGonigle and Superintendent Romberger, however, the two
were dropped from the suit via stipulation on January 7, 2008. Snyder, 650 F.3d at 923.
Moreover, the original claim alleged that the school's policies were vague and overly broad, and
that the school had violated J.S.'s parents' Fourteenth Amendment rights by disciplining her
when she was not under the supervision of school administrators or teachers. Id.at 920.
22 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
23 Snyder, 650 F.3d at 923-24 (noting findings and decision of lower court). The district
court held there was a sufficient connection between the off-campus speech and the on-campus
disruption based on the intended subject matter (the principal in his role as such), the intended
audience, the paper copy brought to McGonigle, the use of McGonigle's picture from the school
website, the retributive reasons for creating the profile, J.S.'s original denial of creation, the
disruption to some school activity, and the viewing of the profile at the school by McGonigle. Id.
Concerning the claim of an overly vague regulation, the court found the policy was sufficiently
narrow to include only the school grounds and school-related activities. Id. Lastly, as to the
parents' Fourteenth Amendment claim, the court found the punishment warranted, given that
Pennsylvania state law allows punishment of students when they are under the control of school
administrators or teachers, which applied in this case. Id.
24 J.S. ex rel Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286, 301-02 (3d Cir.) (noting
potential impact of profile's language enough to forecast a Tinker substantial disruption), reh 'g en
banc granted, vacated, No. 08-4138, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7342 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010). The
Third Circuit further affirmed the lower court on the overly vague nature of the school code and
the parents' Fourteenth Amendment challenge. Id. at 290.
See McCarthy, supra note 2, at 10.
26 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
27 See, e.g., Morse v.Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007) (holding school's confiscation of
banner at school event was not First Amendment violation); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier
484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (holding school may regulate school-sponsored speech for "legitimate
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Tinker was the first case to determine when a school overextends its
authority in suppressing student speech. 28 In Tinker, three students were
suspended when they wore black armbands into school to protest the

Vietnam War; however, other students were free to wear other political
symbols, including one associated with Nazism.

29

In that case, the United

States Supreme Court developed a constraint on a school's authority to
limit student speech, requiring a "substantial and material" disruption to the

school's mission, or reasonable forecast thereof, before the speech in
question could be banned.30 The Court further held that "out of class"
speech is also subject to the material disruption standard.3 '
Seventeen years passed before the Court modified the Tinker
standard, making the Fraser decision the first major exception to the
"substantial disruption" principle.3 2 The defendant in Frasergave a speech
at a school assembly attended by many younger students, where he used

pedagogical concerns"); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986)
(contrasting vulgar and lewd student speech with typical protected speech in the school
environment); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969)
(protecting students' free speech rights where no substantial disruption to school activities
reasonably predicted); Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34,
38-39 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding student's out-of-school speech may cause reasonable forecast of
substantial disruption within school). The Tinker opinion eloquently summarized fifty years of
precedent when it stated, "It can hardly be argued that ... students ... shed their constitutional
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
28 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642 ("We think the action of the local authorities in compelling
the
flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on their power and invades the sphere
of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to
reserve from all official control.") (emphasis added); Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509 ("[W]here there is
no finding and no showing that engaging in the forbidden [speech] would 'materially and
substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the
school,' the prohibition cannot be sustained." (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th
Cir. 1966))); see also S. Elizabeth Wilborn, Teaching the New Three Rs Repression, Rights and
Respect: A Primer of Student Speech Activites, 37 B.C. L. REv. 119, 130 (1995) ("Both Barnette
and Tinker provide strong support to the proposition that student speech activity is entitled to
robust First Amendment protection.").
29 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 510-11 (discussing armbands as only controversial symbol banned).
30 Id. at 509 (noting standard of review requiring material and substantial disruption).
31 Id. at 513 ("But conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason-whether
it stems from time, place, or type of behavior-materially disrupts classwork or involves
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech."). Courts have been willing to apply the Tinker
standard to speech that occurs outside of the school if there is a reasonable forecast that the
speech will cause a substantial, in-school disruption. See J.S. ex rel Snyder v. Blue Mountain
Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 930-31 (3d Cir. 2011) (applying Tinker standard to out-of-school
speech); Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 38-39 (holding Tinker substantial disruption applies to offcampus speech); see also Tomain, supra note 4, at 119-20 (discussing blurring of in-school and
out-of-school speech standard for Fraserexception as well).
32 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) (holding school's goal
of
inculcating appropriate public discourse allows for suppression of offensive speech).

2012]

SNYDER V BL UE MOUNTAIN SCHOOL DISTRICT

413

sexual innuendos as part of a nomination speech and was subsequently
suspended for his conduct.33 Although creating an exception to Tinker,
Justice Brennan's concurrence limited its application to on-campus
speech.34 Recently, the Morse case, which involved speech that advocated
the use of "bong hits," reaffirmed the principal illustrated in Justice
Brennan's concurrence, noting that Fraser'sapplication is limited to oncampus speech only.35
Despite the holdings of Fraser and Morse, several circuits now
face new challenges when cases arise from speech that occurs over the
Internet.36 In Wisniewski v. Board of Education of Weedsport Central
37
School District,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
confronted a case of Internet speech that reached campus only by the
request of school officials.3 8 The court held that it was "reasonably
33 Id. at 677-78. The speech itself contained several references to the nominee's firmness "in
his pants," the fact he "drives hard, pushing and pushing until finally he succeeds," and twice
mentioned words linked to sexual climax. Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring).
34 Id. at 688 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("If respondent had given the same speech outside of
the school environment, he could not have been penalized simply because government officials
considered his language to be inappropriate."); see also Tuneski, supra note 9, at 161 (stating
Fraserdoes not "suggest that schools have authority to reach beyond campus").
35 See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 405 (2007) ("Had Fraser delivered the same speech
in a public forum outside the school context, it would have been protected."). As Morse notes,
the Fraser exception relies upon the in-school nature of the speech, coupled with the necessary
mission of a school to inculcate values that support proper public discourse. Id. Although Morse
created a new exception based on the advocacy of illegal drug use at a school-sponsored event, its
rule is fairly narrow. Id. at 409-10. Justice Robert's majority opinion in Morse, citing Cohen v.
California,403 U.S. 15 (1971), affirmed that a student's rights outside of a school is equal to
those of adults. Morse, 551 U.S. at 405; see also Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d
205, 216 (3d Cir. 2011) ("It would be an unseemly and dangerous precedent to allow the state, in
the guise of school authorities, to reach into a child's home and control his/her actions there to the
same extent that it can control that child when he/she participates in school sponsored
activities."). After discussing the reach of Morse and Fraser,the Third Circuit in Layshock read
both cases to be limited to on-campus speech. Id.; cf Sean R. Nuttall, Note, Rethinking the
Narrative on JudicialDeference in Student Speech Cases, 83 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1282, 1317 n.185
(2008) (noting Justice Alito's concurrence in Morse as more expansive than Chief Justice
Robert's majority opinion).
36 See Tuneski, supra note 9, at 153-58 (discussing various approaches taken by lower courts
in applying Tinker to Internet speech). Tuneski outlines three approaches that have been
developed to deal with Tinker in off-campus settings. Id. at 153. First, some courts have
determined that if the speech, even if created outside of school, is accessed from a school
computer, it falls into Tinker and the school can therefore ban the speech if it creates a substantial
disturbance. Id. at 153-54. A second view regards Internet websites created out-of-school as
totally independent entities and disregards whether they can be accessed or not. Id. at 154-55. A
third variation disregards the location and merely applies Tinker, regardless of whether the speech
ever enters the physical campus. Id. at 155-56.
37 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007).
38 Id. at 39 (holding transmission of teacher's picture away from school property does not
insulate student from discipline).
In Wisniewski, the school suspended the student after
discovering that he had created an AOL Instant Messaging ("I")
icon that depicted Philip
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foreseeable" the speech would come to the school's attention; therefore, the
forecast of a substantial disruption by school officials was proper once they
became aware of the speech.3 9 The Wisniewski court interpreted the Tinker
decision broadly, holding that it be reasonably foreseeable that the speech
could arrive on campus, regardless of where the speech occurred, who was
able to view it, and from where.40 Moreover, there is a division among
district and circuit courts regarding the application of Tinker to off-campus
speech generally, calling into doubt whether the material and substantial
disruption test should even apply. 4'
The Snyder court opened its analysis by noting that courts have
given wide authority to teachers and school administrators when it comes
to the role of public schools in forwarding their educational mission, but
that the authority is not "boundless."42 Despite the political nature of the
VanderMolen, an English teacher, being shot in the head. Id. at 36. Fifteen students outside of
the school viewed the icon and there was no evidence the icon was ever viewed from a school
computer, aside from the requests of the teacher or administrators. Id.
39 Id. at 39-40. The court held that the icon created a reasonably foreseeable disruption
because it was highly likely to come to the attention of the school: it involved a teacher, was
explicitly violent, the student intended for it to reach other students, and it was in circulation for
three weeks. Id. The court noted that once the school became aware of the icon depicting a
teacher being shot in the head, it was reasonable in forecasting a substantial disruption. Id.at 40.
40 Id. at 40.
("These consequences [of communication to the school and the risk of a
substantial disruption] permit school discipline, whether or not [the student] intended his IM icon
to be communicated to school authorities, or, if communicated, to cause a substantial
disruption.").
41 J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 937 (Smith, J.,
concurring)
(detailing difficulty courts have had in applying Tinker to off-campus speech). Compare
Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 39 (holding off-campus speech qualifies for Tinker review), and Thomas
v. Bd. of Educ., Granville Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1052 n.17 (2d Cir. 1979) ("We can, of
course, envision a case in which a group of students incites substantial disruption within the
school from some remote locale."), with Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 615
(5th Cir. 2004) ("[The Tinker standard is] applicable to student expression 'that happens to occur
on the school premises."' (emphasis added)). In Porter, the speech was a drawing made by a
fourteen-year-old student depicting the school "under a state of siege" by a gasoline tanker,
missile launchers, helicopters, and armed persons. Id. at 611. The drawing also contained
"obscenities and racial epithets" regarding the principal and showed a brick being hurled at him.
Id. The drawing was brought to school two years later by another student. Id.; cf Doninger v.
Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 49 (2d Cir. 2008) ("It is not clear, however, that Fraserapplies to offcampus speech."). In Doninger, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
dodged the Fraseranalysis and applied the Tinker standard to off-campus speech. Id. at 50. The
panel further noted the limited scope of the Wisniewski decision by reaffirming that it applied the
Tinker standard without any use of Fraser. Id. at 49-50.
42 Snyder, 650 F.3d at 925-26 (discussing development of case law regarding student
speech). See generally Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969)
(discussing Barnette decision); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)
(holding compulsory pledge of allegiance ceremony violated student's First Amendment rights).
The Snyder court also noted that the judiciary must carefully balance the occasionally competing
values of school administrators' authority and students' First Amendment rights. Snyder, 650
F.3d at 926.
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speech in Tinker, the court noted that First Amendment protections have
43
been widely applied to student speech, regardless of the speech's nature.
Cases such as Fraser, Hazelwood, and Morse have carved out narrow
exceptions to the general protection when student speech infringes on
educational values and norms, such as protecting students from lewd
speech or speech that promotes illegal activity.44 The court then went on to
note that no "substantial disruption" occurred as a result of the speech;
therefore, the analysis focused on the forecast of a "substantial disruption,"
identical to the review the Tinker court engaged in forty years prior in the
midst of the Vietnam War. 45 In applying the Tinker framework, the Snyder
court noted that the MySpace profile could only be accessed by a few
students, lacked any identifying information about McGonigle, was
inaccessible from school computers, and only arrived on school property in

a printout format when McGonigle requested a student bring it to the
school.46 Furthermore, the court determined that the profile was a 'joke"

41 See Snyder, 650 F.3d at 926-27 (discussing application of Tinker standard to student
speech not political in nature); see also Wilborn, supra note 28, at 144 ("Neither the advocates
nor the critics of the Fraser/Hazelwoodanalytical framework have adequately identified the
central problem with a test that focuses on the effect of speech on a school's curriculum or
whether the speech activities might be attributed to the school: the test treats all student speech
the same ....
).
44 Snyder, 650 F.3d at 927 (outlining three exceptions to student speech); Bethel Sch. Dist.
No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986) (not extending First Amendment protections to lewd,
indecent, or plainly offensive speech); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396 (2007) (noting
school's interest in dissuading promotion of drug use during school-sponsored events). Although
the Snyder court notes another exception created by Hazelwood, it was not relied upon in this
case because there was no contention that the school "sponsored" the speech in any manner.
Snyder, 650 F.3d at 927. Moreover, the court read the Morse decision in a narrow sense and
relied heavily upon Justice Alito's concurrence, which distinguished speech occurring in school
from speech occurring outside of school. Id. (citing Morse, 551 U.S. at 424-25 (Alito, J.,
concurring)).
41 Snyder, 650 F.3d at 928 (noting there is no dispute regarding a "substantial disruption" and
analyzing forecast of a disruption) (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514). The Snyder court
summarized the holding of the Tinker case, noting that a review of those facts "fail[ed] to yield
evidence that school authorities had reason to anticipate that the wearing of the armbands . ..
would substantially interfere with the work of the school." Id. at 928 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at
509). The Tinker case arose during the Vietnam War when the United States had just committed
200,000 additional troops as part of Operation Rolling Thunder. Id. In his dissent, Justice Black
outlined the contentious nature of the Vietnam War and how it had divided the country at that
time. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 524 (Black, J., dissenting). Although there was a heated political
environment, the Court held that the record failed to "demonstrate any facts which might
reasonably have led school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference
with school activities." Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514 (emphasis added).
46 Snyder, 650 F.3d at 929 (describing profile's accessibility and content). The school also
cited a string of cases where various circuit courts found a reasonable forecast of a disruption;
however, the court differentiated the case at bar, noting the student in this case took steps to
ensure the profile would not reach the school. Id. at 930-31 ("[The student] took specific steps to
make the profile 'private' so that only her friends could access it. The fact that her friends happen
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because it was so 'juvenile" and "nonsensical" that it could not be-and, in
fact, was not-taken seriously by anyone 7
The Snyder court then turned to the Fraserexception to determine
whether the "lewd, vulgar and offensive" nature of the speech justified the
school in disciplining the student. 48 The court quickly disposed of this
argument, noting that Fraser has never been applied to off-campus
speech. 49 Although a physical copy did arrive on campus, the court blamed
McGonigle because he made the request to a student to bring a copy to him
for review.50 Lastly, the court noted that allowing schools to punish
students for any speech deemed "offensive," as long it was about the
5
school or a school official, would massively broaden Fraser.
Moreover,
allowing such action would deliver a serious blow to student speech
occurring outside of the school, where it has the highest level of First
Amendment protection.52
The Tinker and Fraser frameworks were established well before
any notion of the Internet entered the court's mind; however, given that
society has changed in some ways since those decisions, the applicable
frameworks must change as well. 53 In the Snyder decision, the majority
focused too heavily on where the speech occurred-schools need to have
broader authority in order to properly regulate potentially disruptive
speech. 54 Courts have struggled to determine whether Tinker even applies

to be Blue Mountain Middle School students is not surprising, and does not mean [the student's]
speech targeted the school.")
47 Id. at 929-31 (noting contents were so outrageous as to make allegations contained therein
ridiculous). Although the school contended that the profile might have "aroused suspicions"
about McGonigle's conduct, the court viewed the allegations contained in the profile as so
ridiculous that they could not be taken seriously. Id. at 930. Lastly, the court reasoned that
because the protest in Tinker raised a "highly emotional and controversial subject of the Vietnam
war," which the speech in this case did not, the mere "humiliation" it caused McGonigle is not
sufficient to create a reasonable forecast of a disruption to the school's mission. Id. at 929-31.
41 Snyder, 650 F.3d at 932 (discussing whether the Fraserexception applies).
49 Id. In discussing the inapplicability of the Fraser exception, the court reviewed Justice
Robert's majority opinion in the Morse decision which relied upon the holding in Cohen v.
California, affirming "that a student's free speech rights outside the school context are
coextensive with the rights of an adult." Id. (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971)).
5 Snyder, 650 F.3d at 932.
51 Id. at 932-33 (discussing limited holding of Fraser and more recent cases applying same
standard).
52 See id.
53 See Tuneski, supra note 9, at 160-64 (discussing difficulty various courts have had
applying the Tinker standard to off-campus speech); Interview with Hon. Thomas I. Vanaskie,
supra note 3 ("I don't think you can make [the inside-outside] distinction anymore. The point is
[the internet] is pervasive ... To say that students didn't use a class or school computer to create
the posting and nobody accessed within the school is [not relevant to the analysis].").
4 See McCarthy, supra note 2, at 13 ("If the Third Circuit does uphold the students in both
of these cases, it may become more difficult for school authorities to control student Internet
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to both regular and Internet speech that occurs off-campus, thereby
developing inconsistent rulings regarding the standard.55 The location of
Internet speech should not be a sole determining factor as to the application
56
of Tinker or Fraser.
Courts should draw on relevant factors from each
analysis to determine if the school has a valid interest in regulating the

speech and whether there is a substantial disruption or a reasonable forecast
57
thereof.
Such factors would include the intended target or subject matter
of the speech; the threat of disruption to the school mission, including
investigation into accusations; the use of school property, including
Internet resources; and the nature of the speech and whether it is vulgar,

offensive, libelous, or defamatory.58
First, the intended target and subject matter of the speech are
relevant factors given that schools have a direct interest in investigating

expression that is critical of school personnel or hurtful toward classmates. Indeed, school
policies have not kept pace with technological advances in this regard."); Interview with Hon.
Thomas I. Vanaskie, supra note 3 (noting location of Internet speech as off-campus is an illusory
and irrelevant distinction).
" Snyder, 650 F.3d at 937 (Smith, J., concurring) ("Lower courts, however, are divided on
whether Tinker's substantial-disruption test governs students' off-campus expression."); see also
Tomain, supra note 4, at 122-28 (discussing difficulties court has with Internet speech).
56 Interview with Hon. Thomas I. Vanaskie, supra note 3 ("I don't even know
if [the location
of the internet speech as 'off campus'] should be a factor. I guess it should be a factor, but not a
determinative factor."). Judge Vanaskie further remarked that student speech should receive
reduced First Amendment protections when the student directs the speech toward the school
campus or grounds. Id.
7 See Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 39-40 (2d Cir.
2007) ("We have recognized that off-campus conduct can create a foreseeable risk of substantial
disruption within a school ... as have other courts ....); McCarthy, supra note 2, at 12 ("As
noted, Fraser remains the most ambiguous of the Supreme Court's student expression rulings,
which has spawned a range of lower court interpretations."). The author notes that a case out of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held Fraserto be applicable to speech
that interferes with a school's mission generally, but a panel from the Second Circuit viewed
Frasernarrowly as dealing only with sexually explicit or profane speech. See McCarthy, supra
note 2, at 3 n.12. Although it is unclear how and when Fraser and Tinker will be clarified, a
broad view of Fraser would provide schools more leeway in terms of limiting speech that is
vulgar, offensive, defamatory, or libelous. See Interview with Hon. Thomas I. Vanaskie, supra
note 3 ("[The analysis of student speech] is all within the context of things that happen in the
school and the school administration should have effective remedies available to it .... [Ilit is in
the student's best interest to understand that there are lines that you cannot cross that there is a
point where satire no longer exists and it just becomes wrong conduct.").
58 See Snyder, 650 F.3d at 929 (looking to the totality of circumstances surrounding the
MySpace profile); Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 50 (2d Cir. 2008) ("The blog posting
directly pertained to events at LMHS, and Avery's intent in writing it was specifically 'to
encourage her fellow students to read and respond."'); Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 38-39 (applying
Tinker standard); Interview with Hon. Thomas I. Vanaskie, supra note 3 ("If we are going to use
Tinker as the test [targeting the principal inhis capacity as such] goes to the question of whether
there is potential for substantial disruption of the school atmosphere and discipline. [The student
is] undermining the authority of the principal.").
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accusations made against an authority figure, as well as disciplining
students when they attack a school official in that capacity.59 The intended
target and subject matter affect the analysis of whether the student had
intended for the speech to reach onto school grounds. 60 However, this
factor should be limited only to school-related activities, employees, or
events, and would not include personal criticism of school officials in
other, unofficial capacities. 6' Branching off of that aspect is the second
factor, which deals with the potential for a substantial disruption created by
a school's duty to investigate accusations made against teachers,
administrators, or other school officials.62 Given that the vast majority of
students communicate through the Internet, it behooves the school to take
seriously any accusations made in such a popular and widespread forum,
and to properly discipline the students making those accusations.63
59 See Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 39-40 (discussing foreseeability that icon of teacher being
shot would come to attention of school officials); Doninger, 527 F.3d at 49-51 (noting Internet
post encouraged students to contact school official to "piss her off").
60 See Snyder, 650 F.3d 915 at 940 (Smith, J., concurring) ("Regardless of its place of origin,

speech intentionally directed towards a school is properly considered on-campus speech.");
Doninger, 527 F.3d at 50 ("The blog posting directly pertained to events at LMHS, and [the
student's] intent in writing it was specifically 'to encourage her fellow students to read and
respond."' (quoting Doninger v. Niehoff, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199, 206 (D. Conn. 2007))); see also
Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 39 ("We are in agreement, however, that, on the undisputed facts, it was
reasonably foreseeable that the [AOL Instant Messaging] icon would come to the attention of
school authorities and the teacher whom the icon depicted being shot.").
61 See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 405 (2007) (noting drug-related speech
would be
protected outside school environment); Interview with Hon. Thomas I. Vanaskie, supra note 3
(distinguishing being critical of a principal in his professional capacity rather than personal
capacity).
62 See Snyder, 650 F.3d at 941 (Fisher, J., dissenting) (detailing accusations contained
in
MySpace profile). In Snyder, the principal stood accused of hitting on students and their parents,
and having sex in his office. Id. The dissent also noted that such accusations have a wider
impact given that parents, other students, teachers, administrators, and the general public will all
likely become aware of them. Id. at 945-46. Such a disruption could reasonably cause a material
and substantial disruption to the school's mission. Id. Also, J.S. did not make the profile
"private" until several students approached her at school to speak with her about the profile. Id.
at 921; see also supra note 57 (noting context of school speech relevant to analysis). Judge
Vanaskie further noted that the "substantial disruption" could come from a required investigation
into the school official's conduct. Id. The judge used the example of Jerry Sandusky, the former
Penn State coach charged with various child molestation and rape charges, as an instance of how
a school needs to take all accusations against a teacher, administrator, or coach, seriously. Id.
Moreover, even if the accusations are baseless, one cannot evaluate them retrospectively, and
must view the possible disruption from the eyes of an administrator at the outset of the
investigation. Id. See generally Lenhart supra note 14 (noting prevalence of Internet-capable cell
phones in schools). The website could have been accessed via a student's Intemet-enabled cell
phone without the use of a school computer, thereby entering the school. Id.
63 See McCarthy, supra note 2, at 13 ("If the Third Circuit does uphold the students in both
of these cases, it may become more difficult for school authorities to control student Internet
expression that is critical of school personnel or hurtful toward classmates."); supra note 57
(discussing school administration's interest in disciplining offensive speech that involves school
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The second two factors rely more heavily on Fraser, given that
schools have an interest in regulating the use of their resources along with
the nature of the speech in question.64 The third consideration should be
the use of school resources, which could include a school website or email

service. 65 Although mere use of a school website might be a weaker factor
than using its email service, the more exclusive the access to the site or
technology, the more interest the school has in regulating its use.66 Lastly,
a review of the nature of the speech would be warranted given that vulgar,
accusatory, defamatory, or obscene speech-when directed specifically
toward a coach, teacher, or administrator-raises the school's interest in its
regulation.67 Courts have looked to the nature of the speech and its

officials); see also Snyder, 650 F.3d at 945 (Fisher, J., dissenting) (discussing negative impact
speech can have if school officials cannot discipline students effectively).
64 See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 689 (Brennan, J., concurring)
("Respondent's speech may well have been protected had he given it in school but under different
circumstances, where the school's legitimate interests in teaching and maintaining civil public
discourse were less weighty."). Although his concurrence limited the holding in Fraser,it is of
note that Justice Brennan recognized that schools have a raised interest in regulating civil
discourse in an arena created and regulated by the school primarily for educational purposes. Id.
at 687-88.
65 See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685 ("A high school assembly or classroom
is no place for a
sexually explicit monologue directed towards an unsuspecting audience of teenage students.").
The student in Fraser hijacked a forum for student speeches to make a sexually explicit speech
nominating a friend.
Id. at 677-78.
The court, in acknowledging the use of the
assembly/classroom, implicitly recognized that such forums are meant to be used solely for the
"inculcat[ion] [of] fundamental values." Id. at 681. The modem educational forums for students
include computers and school technology. See McCarthy, supra note 2, at 13 (recognizing
Internet as preferred method of communication for most students); see also Snyder, 650 F.3d at
944 (Fisher, J., dissenting) (specifically noting photo of principal was taken from school website).
66 See Interview with Hon. Thomas I. Vanaskie, supra note 3 (stating use of an Internet
site
as a weaker factor based on the wide access/availability of the site). Although Judge Vanaskie
noted that the Internet cuts both ways in terms of a school having a lower interest in a Internet
website they "broadcast" to the world, the use of an intranet site-a site that is accessible only to
certain users might make the factor more compelling given the school has greater control over
the resource. Id. In both Wisniewski and Doninger, the students did not use any school
technology, but both of the courts found that a substantial disruption existed. Doninger v.
Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 49-50 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting student created speech off-campus without use
of any school resources); Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34,
39 (2d Cir. 2007) (same). Neither the Doninger nor the Wisniewski panel reached the issue of
whether Fraser should be applied, which is likely why the use of school resources was not
addressed. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 49-50 (rejecting use of Fraserstandard); Wisniewski, 494 F.3d
at 38-40 (applying Tinker standard only).
67 See Snyder, 650 F.3d at 952 (Fisher, J., dissenting) ("In student free speech cases,
courts
must grapple with the issue of promoting freedom of expression while maintaining a conducive
learning environment."); Interview with Hon. Thomas I. Vanaskie, supra note 3 ("[The] nature of
the speech is a factor to be taken into consideration. I know we have broad First Amendment
protections, [but] on the other hand we are talking about a student."). Judge Vanaskie further
noted that he was "concerned about the break down of civility of our society in general" and the
nature of the speech should be relevant to whether the school has an interest in disciplining the
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truthfulness, along with whether the student engages in any defamation
concerning a school official's reputation in the employment capacity. 68
On February 24, 2012, the Tinker decision turned forty-two years
old; on July 7, 2012, the Fraserdecision turns twenty-six years old. Every
United States Supreme Court Justice involved in those two cases has either
retired or is no longer living. Now is the time for a new generation of
Justices, well versed in the complexity of the digital age, to take on the
Snyder, Wisniewski, and Doninger line of cases that have troubled the
lower courts for nearly a decade. The Court must recognize today that the
Internet is both a helpful and dangerous tool in forwarding a new
generation of civil discourse for schools and students. Schools need the
proper tools in order to shape and mold this new digital generation, while
simultaneously protecting the sacred rights contained in the First
Amendment. The factors outlined here provide the necessary regulations
and protections in keeping with the spirit of the Barnette, Tinker, and
Fraserdecisions.
ChristopherLynett

student. Id; see also Fraser, 478 U.S. at 684-85 (noting school's interest in regulating lewd,
vulgar, and offensive speech).
68 See Doninger, 527 F.3d at 50-51 ("First, the language with which Avery chose to
encourage others to contact the administration was not only plainly offensive, but also potentially
disruptive of efforts to resolve the ongoing controversy. Her chosen words in essence, that
others should call the 'douchebags' in the central office to 'piss [them] off more' were hardly
conducive to cooperative conflict resolution."); Snyder, 650 F.3d at 945 (Fisher, J., dissenting)
(noting offensive nature of speech linked to disruption). The dissent in Snyder further reasoned
that offensive speech has a broader impact in terms of interfering with a teacher, principal,
guidance counselor, or other official's ability to perform his or her job effectively. Id. ("It was
foreseeable that J.S.'s false accusations and malicious comments would disrupt [the principal's]
and [guidance counselor's] ability to perform their jobs."); see also note 62 and accompanying

text.

